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Textual entailment is a relationship that obtains between
fragments of text when one fragment in some sense
implies the other fragment. The automation of textual
entailment recognition supports a wide variety of text-
based tasks, including information retrieval, information
extraction, question answering, text summarization, and
machine translation. Much ingenuity has been devoted to
developing algorithms for identifying textual entailments,
but relatively little to saying what textual entailment actu-
ally is. This article is a review of the logical and philo-
sophical issues involved in providing an adequate
definition of textual entailment. We show that many natu-
ral definitions of textual entailment are refuted by coun-
terexamples, including the most widely cited definition of
Dagan et al. We then articulate and defend the following
revised definition: T textually entails H5 df typically, a
human reading T would be justified in inferring the prop-
osition expressed by H from the proposition expressed
by T. We also show that textual entailment is context-sen-
sitive, nontransitive, and nonmonotonic.
Introduction
Textual entailment is a relationship that obtains between
fragments of text when one fragment in some sense implies
the other. Recognizing such connections is an important and
routine part of linguistic communication, whether in com-
mon conversation or scientific literature. As a consequence,
the automation of textual entailment recognition can support
a wide variety of text-based tasks, including information
retrieval, information extraction, question answering, text
summarization, and machine translation (Bos & Markert,
2005; Harabagiu & Hickl, 2007; Pado et al., 2009; Blake,
2011). More generally, almost all tools and applications in
use today to navigate and exploit online textual material
stand to benefit from the automated identification of textual
entailments, which can help end users navigate the deluge of
information from online communities, open access article
databases, and other such sources (Renear & Palmer, 2009).
For instance, a question answering application would benefit
from recognizing that the text “John bought a novel yes-
terday” textually entails “John bought a book,” enabling it
to identify the former as a suitable response to the query
“Did John buy a book?”1
Textual entailment research largely consists of develop-
ing and exploring approaches to algorithmic identification
of entailments. Considerable ingenuity has gone into devel-
oping such algorithms, particularly under the auspices of the
PASCAL project’s Recognizing Textual Entailment (RTE)
challenges. Building upon the RTE challenges’ successes,
numerous researchers are now in the midst of testing
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systems that leverage textual entailments: pioneering new
kinds of information retrieval systems (Udayakumar et al.,
2014), developing new means of analyzing text (Magnini
et al., 2014; Kolterman et al., 2015) and interpreting meta-
phors (Mohler et al., 2013), and validating results from ques-
tion answering workflows (Gomez-Adorno et al., 2013).2
By contrast, relatively little effort has gone into determin-
ing exactly what textual entailment, the object of study, actu-
ally is. Since such definitions are the cornerstone of the
instructions that annotators use when making gold standard
data sets—which in turn are used to develop, train, and test
algorithms for recognizing textual entailments—it is impor-
tant that we have the best possible understanding of the con-
cept when developing instructions. Annotations or algorithms
that strictly adhere to the proffered definition should not
result in verdicts that all parties agree are misguided—which
is exactly what could happen with a flawed definition.
This article is a review of the logical and philosophical
issues involved in providing an adequate definition of tex-
tual entailment. We conduct a systematic analysis of logical
accounts of textual entailment and discuss why each of them
is ultimately unsatisfactory. We then examine both the
advantages and the shortcomings of what has emerged as
the standard definition of textual entailment, due to Ido
Dagan and his collaborators (Dagan et al., 2005, 2009), and
we articulate and defend a more adequate definition.
Logical Approaches to Textual Entailment
The terminology of “entailment,” as well as at least some
of the exemplary illustrations of textual entailment relation-
ships, bring to mind the possibility that concepts such as log-
ical implication or deductive consequence may be relevant
to defining textual entailment. But, as many parties to this
literature have observed, textual entailment cannot be ade-
quately defined in such terms. Before turning to a more ade-
quate, inferential approach, it is worth reviewing a variety of
similarly named concepts in formal logic to see why textual
entailment cannot be analyzed in terms of them.
Textual Entailment as Material Implication
It is not uncommon to express textual entailment in terms
of natural language (indicative) conditionals: “if T then H.”
Elementary logic textbooks recommend representing natural
language conditionals, at least for some purposes, as mate-
rial conditionals (or “material implications”), which are
compound propositions (P Q) with a truth-functional com-
positional semantics: a material conditional is false when its
antecedent is true and the consequent false, and it is true for
the other three possible combinations of truth values (true/
true, false/true, false/false).
Suppose that we defined textual entailment as material
implication:
(D1) T textually entails H 5df T  H
It may be that D1 gives an accurate necessary condition for
textual entailment. But, as has been widely acknowledged,
counterexamples to the sufficiency of material implication
are easy to find. The definiens will be satisfied by any true
H, regardless of T, and by any false T, regardless of H. So,
for instance, the following will be textual entailments
according to D1:
(T1) Albany is the capital of New York
(H1) Austin is the capital of Texas
(T2) Oswego is the capital of New York
(H2) Austin is the capital of Texas
(T3) Oswego is the capital of New York
(H3) El Paso is the capital of Texas
Each pair satisfies the definiens of D1, but would clearly not
be considered cases of textual entailment; consequently,
they reveal that the definiens (T  H) is not a sufficient con-
dition for textual entailment.
Textual Entailment as Strict Implication
Material implication is not a sufficient condition for tex-
tual entailment. A narrower logical relationship, one that
avoids the counterexamples above, is strict or logical impli-
cation (or in logic and philosophy, sometimes simply entail-
ment). Intuitively, P strictly implies Q if it is (in an
appropriately strong sense) impossible for it to both be the
case that P is true and that Q is false.3
(D2) T textually entails H 5df w(T  H)
The counterexamples to D1 considered above are not coun-
terexamples to D2 because in each case it is possible for the
antecedent to be true and the consequent false—if, for
instance, the history of the United States had been other than
it in fact was.
However, even though strict implication sets a higher bar
than material implication, D2 has similar counterintuitive
implications. For instance, D2 treats both of the following as
textual entailments:
(T4) Oswego is the capital of New York and Oswego is not
the capital of New York
(H4) El Paso is the capital of Texas
2Research in textual entailment grew rapidly between 2004 and the
present, and there have been over 3,000 articles published on textual
entailment and a series of influential conferences on automated identifi-
cation of textual entailment. For just a sample, see Dagan and Glickman
(2004), Dagan et al. (2005), Bar-Haim et al. (2006), Giampiccolo et al.
(2007), Giampiccolo et al. (2008), Dagan et al. (2009), Androutsopoulos
and Malakasiotis (2010), Sammons and Roth (2012), and Pado and
Dagan (forthcoming). See Monz and de Rijke (2001) for an important
precursor.
3Here we have in mind what philosophers would call “broadly logi-
cal impossibility” (Plantinga 1974, ch.1) or “impossibility tout court”
(Kripke, 1980, p. 99), as distinguished from mere physical impossibility.
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(T5) Oswego is the capital of New York
(H5) El Paso is the capital of Texas or El Paso is not the
capital of Texas
In each case it is impossible for the text to be true and the
hypothesis false. In the first case this is because it is impossi-
ble for T4 to be true, from which it follows trivially that it is
impossible for T4 to be true while H4 is false. In the second
case this is because it is impossible for H5 to be false, from
which it follows trivially that it is impossible for T5 to be
true while H5 is false. Consequently, both fit the definition
of strict implication and satisfy the definiens of D2. How-
ever, neither counts intuitively as a case of textual
entailment.
A corollary is that automated theorem provers that strictly
adhere to D2 are bound to deliver false predictions when
dealing with contradictory texts and tautologous hypotheses.
Because every tautology is strictly implied by everything,
they will wrongly predict that every available tautologous
text is a textual entailment of every text, and because every
contradiction strictly implies everything, they will wrongly
predict that every available contradictory text textually
entails everything.
Textual Entailment as Relevant Implication
Both material implication and strict implication fail to
provide a sufficient condition for textual entailment, largely
due to the fact that both allow seemingly unrelated texts and
hypotheses to count as textual entailments. The natural fix,
then, is to require that T be, in some sense, relevant to H.
One way of securing this is to make use of the logician’s
notion of relevant implication, where, very roughly, p1. . .pn
relevantly imply q iff (i) p1. . .pn strictly imply q and (ii) the
deduction of q from p1. . .pn makes use of all of p1. . .pn.
Thus, we get:
(D3) T textually entails H 5df T relevantly implies H
This gives us the correct result in the case of T5/H5. The
conclusion is a tautology that can just as well be derived
from the empty set. Since the deduction of H5 does not
make use of T5, T5 doesn’t relevantly imply H5, and D3
gives the right result that this is not a textual entailment.
More obviously needs to be said about what it is to
“make use of” a premise.4 Fortunately, there is no need to
fill in these details in order to see that the incorporation of
relevance constraints is not enough to secure an intuitive
account of textual entailment. Imagine an exemplary case of
mathematical reasoning from some axioms a1. . .an to a
highly complicated and nonobvious theorem t. Suppose fur-
ther that the axioms are consistent and are all (in some intui-
tive sense) used in reasoning to the theorem. This should be
a case of relevant implication if anything is. Thus, D3 will
count this as a textual entailment:
(T6) a1. . .an
(H6) t
But we can suppose that the mathematical deduction is quite
abstruse—a major intellectual achievement, rather than the
sort of natural inference associated with textual entailment.
In fact, D3 will not only count such difficult mathematical
deductions as textual entailments, it will count all relevant
deductions of any kind, including those not yet achieved,
and even those (if any) that are cognitively unachievable, as
textual entailments. So relevant implication cannot be suffi-
cient for textual entailment.
Textual Entailment as Doxastic Implication
One feature shared by all of the counterexamples to D1,
D2, and D3 is that it is always possible for a reader to
believe the one without believing the other. So perhaps the
fix is to require, not that the text strictly implies the hypothe-
sis, but rather that believing the text strictly implies believ-
ing the hypothesis. In other words, one text textually entails
another just in case it is impossible for someone to believe
the one without believing the other5:
(D4) T textually entails H 5df
w(8x)[believes(x,T)  believes(x,H)]
In short: textual entailment is doxastic implication.
There are at least two problems with this account. The
first is that doxastic implication is far too demanding to
serve as a constraint on textual entailment. Consider the fol-
lowing case:
(T7) There are Algerians in Paris
(H7) There are Algerians in France
This seems to be a textual entailment. And yet it is surely
possible for someone to believe T7 without believing H7,
perhaps because they are aware that there are Algerians in
Paris but mistakenly believe that Paris is in Italy.
The second problem is that there are plausibly some
propositions that are impossible to believe, for instance, that
something is green and nothing is green. If that is right, then
D4 predicts that the following is a textual entailment:
(T8) Something is green and nothing is green
(H8) El Paso is the capital of Texas
After all, it’s impossible for someone to believe T8 without
believing H8—as D4 requires—precisely because it’s
impossible for someone to believe T8 in the first place. But
T8 does not textually entail H8; the two texts intuitively
have nothing to do with one another. Thus, D4 faces the
same problem as D1 and D2, in allowing unrelated texts and
hypotheses to count as textual entailments. Doxastic impli-
cation is not sufficient for textual entailment.
4Cf. Mares (2012) for general discussion of relevance logic.
5See Renear (1988) for an account of how doxastic implication can
be used to refine propositional relationships.
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As we’ll see below, doxastic implication is not entirely
off the mark. The correct analysis of textual entailment will
make use of a related, but importantly different notion. Very
roughly, it’s not that believing the text entails believing the
hypothesis, but rather that believing the text rationally com-
mits one to believing the hypothesis.
Textual Entailment as Relevant Doxastic Implication
One might think that combining D3 and D4 will help:
(D5) T textually entails H 5df
i. w(8x)[believes(x,T)  believes(x,H)] and
ii. T relevantly implies H
This yields the correct result that T6 does not textually entail
H6. Condition (i) requires a certain level of cognitive prox-
imity between T and H by requiring that it is impossible that
T be believed and H not be believed. Accordingly, D5 is not
susceptible to the counterexamples we raised against D3. D5
also correctly predicts that T8 does not textually entail H8:
since T8 does not relevantly imply H8, condition (ii) is not
met.
However, T7/H7 remains a problem. This is a genuine
case of textual entailment, but, as indicated in in the previ-
ous section, it is possible to believe the one without believ-
ing the other. So condition (i) is not met; D5 specifies
inaccurate necessary conditions for textual entailment.
Moreover, just as D3 and D4 can be combined into a sin-
gle definition, their problems can likewise be compounded
into a single counterexample. Once again, let a1. . .an be
some simple axioms and let t be some complex theorem that
is strictly implied by the axioms via some highly compli-
cated deduction. Here is our counterexample:
(T9) a1. . .an & something is green and nothing is green
(H9) t & something is green and nothing is green
T9 does relevantly imply H9, since a1. . .an by hypothesis
relevantly implies t. Moreover, it is impossible to believe T9
without believing H9, because it is impossible to believe
T9’s second conjunct and, thus, impossible to believe T9 as
a whole. So both conditions of D5 are satisfied, and D5 thus
predicts that T9 textually entails H9. But T9 does not textu-
ally entail H9, since a1. . .an don’t textually entail t.
Inferential Approaches to Textual Entailment
What we saw in the preceding section is that it is a mis-
take to analyze textual entailment in terms of such logical
notions as material implication, strict implication, doxastic
implication, or relevant implication. An alternative approach
is to analyze it in terms of inference. Dagan, Glickman, and
Magnini (2005) developed an inferential definition for use
in the PASCAL RTE challenges, and the following refined
and widely-cited definition was advanced by Dagan, Dolan,
Magnini, and Roth (2009):
(D6) T textually entails H 5df typically, a human reading T
would infer that H is most probably true
We begin by surveying some of the advantages of the
inferential approach. We then turn to our main contribution:
exposing the shortcomings of the definitions offered by
Dagan and collaborators, articulating an improved definition
that avoids these shortcomings, and defending our preferred
definition against a range of objections.
Advantages of Inferential Analyses
Let us begin by examining three advantages of shifting to
an inferential approach.
First, inferential analyses like D6 avoid several of the
problems that arose for the logical analyses discussed above.
Consider, for instance, one of our counterexamples to D1:
(T3) Oswego is the capital of New York
(H3) El Paso is the capital of Texas
In contrast to D1, D6 correctly predicts that T3 does not tex-
tually entail H3: people wouldn’t typically infer that El Paso
is probably the capital of Texas upon reading T3.
D7 also avoids the problem of impossible antecedents that
plagued the analysis of textual entailment as strict implication:
(T4) Oswego is the capital of New York and Oswego is not
the capital of New York
(H4) El Paso is the capital of Texas
In contrast to D2, D6 correctly predicts that T4 does not textu-
ally entail H4: people wouldn’t typically infer that El Paso is
probably the capital of Texas upon reading T4. Similar points
apply to the problem of necessary consequents.
It likewise escapes the counterexamples to the doxastic
implication analysis:
(T8) Something is green and nothing is green
(H8) El Paso is the capital of Texas
Unlike D4, D6 correctly predicts that this is not a textual
entailment: people wouldn’t typically infer that El Paso is
probably the capital of Texas upon reading T8.
Second, inferential analyses like D6 are able to accom-
modate cases of textual entailment involving pragmatically
generated implicatures. For instance, consider the following
case:
(T10) Most of the passengers in the crash last year survived
(H10) Some of the passengers died in the crash
T10 does textually entail H10. But T10 does not strictly
imply H10: T10 would still be true even if every passenger
survived. So D2, D3, and D5 are all going to give the wrong
result (as will D4, but for different reasons). D6, by contrast,
gives the right result: a human reading T10 typically would
infer that not all of the passengers survived. That’s because
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“most” strongly suggests “not all.” Reading T10, competent
readers will naturally assume that not all the passengers sur-
vived, for in that case the author of the text would have said
so and would not have made the weaker claim T10.6 D6 is
sensitive to the pragmatic norms that govern the inferential
practices of ordinary readers.7
Third, inferential analyses like D6 are able to accommo-
date cases of textual entailment that rely on common back-
ground knowledge, including generic, geographic, and
lexical knowledge.8 For instance, T7/H7 should evidently be
counted as a case of textual entailment:
(T7) There are Algerians in Paris
(H7) There are Algerians in France
And indeed, people reading T7 would typically infer that H7
is most probably true, since people typically know that Paris
is in France.9 So D6 makes the right prediction. But D2, D3,
D4, and D5 all wrongly predict that this is not a textual
entailment: T7 does not strictly imply H7 (Paris could come
to be part of a different country) nor is it impossible to
believe T7 without also believing H7.10
Refining the Inferential Analysis
The foregoing makes clear why we think that an inferen-
tial approach to textual entailment is on the right track. But
D6, as stated, faces a series of problems that must be
addressed by any satisfactory inferential analysis.
The first is the problem of irrelevant trivialities.
(T13) Lions are dangerous
(H13) I am reading something right now
Typical humans reading T13 would infer that (it is probably
true that) they are reading something. So D6 implies that
T13 textually entails H13. But it doesn’t; T13 is about lions,
not about you and what you are doing.
This problem can be ameliorated by “anchoring” the
inference in T itself:
(D7) T textually entails H 5df typically, a human reading T
would infer from T that H is most probably true
In other words, for a text to entail a hypothesis, readers must
be disposed to infer the hypothesis from the text itself. Read-
ers of T13 do not infer that they are reading from T13
itself—the claim that lions are dangerous itself provides no
support for the claim that they are reading something—but
rather from the fact that they just read T13. Since D7
requires that the hypotheses be inferred from the text itself,
it does not yield the result that T13 textually entails H13.
However, D7 still falls victim to a related problem. Con-
sider the following text/hypothesis pair:
(T14) All your base are belong to us
(H14) The author of T14 is not a native English speaker
T14 does not textually entail H14. But H14 is something
that typical readers would naturally infer from T14—specifi-
cally, from T14’s bad grammar. So D7 wrongly predicts that
T14 does textually entail H14.
To avoid this problem, we need to understand the envis-
aged inference as involving, not the strings T14 and H14,
but rather as involving what is asserted by those strings: their
contents, their meanings, the propositions they express.
What we need, then, is D8:
(D8) T textually entails H 5df typically, a human reading T
would infer from the proposition expressed by T that
the proposition expressed by H is most probably true
The proposition expressed by T14 (roughly, that all of your
bases belong to us) does not entail or otherwise support the
conclusion that its author is not a native English speaker. Thus,
one would not typically infer what is asserted by an utterance
of H14 from what is asserted by an utterance of T14. D8 cor-
rectly predicts that this is not a case of textual entailment. For
ease of exposition, we will occasionally continue to speak of
inferring hypotheses from texts, but this should be understood
throughout as elliptical for talk of inferring what is expressed
by one from what is expressed by the other.
The explicit reference to the proposition expressed also
helps secure the right result for texts involving pronouns or
6Competent readers would also naturally assume that the fate of the
remaining passengers is not unknown, for in that case one would expect
the author to have qualified the statement: “we know that most passen-
gers survived the crash; indeed, perhaps all of them did.”
7See Zaenen et al. (2005) for further discussion of conversational
and conventional implicature and its relation to textual entailment.
Notice that the RTE5 guidelines take for granted that implicature is rele-
vant to textual entailment: http://www.nist.gov/tac/2009/RTE/RTE5_
Main_Guidelines.pdf. They say that T11 does not textually entail H11—
(T11) Yesterday 30 people were killed in a train accident near
London.
(H11) 27 people died in a train accident.
—presumably because H11 is naturally read as saying that only 27 died.
Yet T11 does require the truth of H11, since there cannot be 30 deaths
without there being 27 deaths.
8See Bos and Markert (2005) for discussion of the varieties of back-
ground knowledge.
9We are assuming that this text is read in a context in which “Paris”
is naturally read as referring to the European city, not, for example, to
Paris, Texas. More on ambiguity in Background Knowledge, below.
10The same point can be made using an example from the RTE1
data set:
(T12) The Republic of Yemen is an Arab, Islamic, and independent
sovereign state whose integrity is inviolable, and no part of
which may be ceded.
(H12) The national language of Yemen is Arabic.
RTE1 designates this as a genuine textual entailment. But T12 does not
logically entail H12; it is logically possible for Yemen to be a sovereign
Arab state and yet have no national language. So D2 predicts that T12
does not textually entail H12. D6, by contrast, does predict that T12 tex-
tually entails H12: people would typically infer that Arabic is most
probably the national language of Yemen from the information in T12
together with their background knowledge about national languages (for
example, that countries typically have one). Cf. Dagan et al. (2009: v).
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ambiguous terms. For instance, does the text “Angela Mer-
kel is the Chancellor of Germany” textually entail the text
“She is a German politician”? That depends on whether the
latter text expresses a proposition about Angela Merkel. If it
does, and if the context makes this apparent to a typical
reader, then this is a case of textual entailment; if not, then it
isn’t a case of textual entailment. This is just to say that D8
is poised to make the right predictions in such cases.
Although it clearly leaves open the fraught philosophical
question of what determines the referent of a pronoun or
demonstrative in a given context, as well as the difficult
practical question of how to build an algorithm that can
identify the intended referent of a pronoun or the intended
sense of an ambiguous term.11
It should be noted that Dagan et al. (2009) appear to rec-
ognize the need for these first two modifications. Elsewhere,
Dagan et al. (2005) provide an importantly different charac-
terization of textual entailment:
(D9) T textually entails H 5df the meaning of H can be
inferred from the meaning of T, as would typically be
interpreted by people12
This incorporates both the needed anchoring of the inference
in T itself and the needed reference to the propositions
expressed by T and H.
However, while avoiding the problems we have raised for
D6, D9 has problems of its own. The most serious problem
stems from the fact that, unlike D6 which is framed in terms
of what would be inferred from a text, D9 is framing in terms
of what can be inferred from a text. Accordingly, the coun-
terexample to D3—in which the hypothesis can be inferred
from the text but only by some extraordinarily complicated
line of reasoning—turns out to be a counterexample to D9 as
well. Likewise, the mere fact that it is possible for some con-
fused individual to infer from T15 that H15 is likely true
would (according to D9) suffice for textual entailment:
(T15) Tom is from Paris
(H15) Tom is from Italy
But clearly there is no textual entailment here. D8 does not
make these unwanted predictions, since it requires that typi-
cal readers would draw the inference, not just that someone
could. D8 is an improvement on D6 and D9, incorporating
the desirable features of both and eliminating some of the
undesirable features.
We have seen that D8 avoids the problems posed for
other inferential approaches examined thus far. But D8 is
problematic as well, since it faces a problem of overlooked
entailments:
(T16) Charles was enjoying a relaxing bath
(H16) Charles does not have ablutophobia, the extreme fear
of bathing
T16 does evidently textually entail H16. But it would not
typically occur to someone to draw any inferences about
whether Charles is an ablutophobe. The fear of bathing typi-
cally wouldn’t even cross their mind when reading T16;
most people haven’t even heard of ablutophobia. Put another
way, inferring that Charles most probably does not have
ablutophobia is not something that a human would typically
do upon reading T16. So D8 wrongly predicts that T16 does
not textually entail H16.13
The problem can be fixed by requiring only that one be
justified in making the inference. To say that someone is jus-
tified in inferring p from q is, roughly, to say that it is rea-
sonable for her/him to make the inference, given what s/he
knows about p and q and his/her other background knowl-
edge.14 Crucially, it can be true that one would be justified
in making an inference even when one hasn’t in fact made
the inference.15 Here then is the needed revision:
(D10) T textually entails H 5df typically, a human reading T
would be justified in inferring from the proposition
expressed by T that the proposition expressed by H is
most probably true
One would be justified in inferring H16 from T16, even
though it is highly unlikely that one would actually make
the inference. So D10 delivers the right result, that T16 does
textually entail H16.16
There is one further problem, which plagues all of the
inferential analyses surveyed thus far, including D10. This is
the problem of uninferrable likelihoods:
(T17) John entered a million-ticket raffle
(H17) John lost the raffle
T17 does not textually entail H17: T17 leaves it entirely
open who won the raffle. But one who reads T17 would typ-
ically infer that H17 is most probably true, and this inference
would indeed be justified. So D10 wrongly predicts that
H17 is textually entailed by T17.
This brings us to what we take to be the correct analysis (mod-
ulo one final adjustment in Background Knowledge, below):
11See Lewis (1979), Kaplan (1989), and Braun (2015, §1.4) on phil-
osophical challenges, and see Mirkin et al. (2010) on challenges for
implementation.
12Actually, they present this only as a sufficient condition for textual
entailment, and so may not intend for it to be a definition.
13We choose an example involving such an obscure phobia in part
to head off objections to the effect that one might sometimes noncon-
sciously infer a hypothesis from a text. But since people typically do
not even have the concept ablutophobia, it can’t be that people typically
infer anything about ablutophobia, even nonconsciously.
14See Feldman (2002: ch. 4–5) for a useful introduction to the
notion of justification.
15Cf. Feldman (2002: 46) on the difference between having a belief
that is justified and being justified in forming that belief.
16Alternatively, one might modify D6 (or D7 or D8) to say “T textu-
ally entails H 5df typically, a human reading T and H would infer. . ..”
It may be that this is what Dagan and collaborators had intended for D6
to say. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this observation.
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(D11) T textually entails H 5df typically, a human reading T
would be justified in inferring the proposition
expressed by H from the proposition expressed by T
All that we have done is drop the reference to probability, so that
now what one must be justified in inferring is that H is true, not
merely that it is highly likely to be true. And while one would be
justified in inferring that H17 is probably true, one would not be
justified in inferring H17 straight-out—someone wins the raffle,
after all, and there is no good reason to think it isn’t John. So
D11 rightly predicts that T17 does not textually entail H17.
Clarifications and Complications
In this section we test our proposed definition of textual
entailment against some challenging text/hypothesis pairs.
Through these tests, we also uncover some interesting for-
mal properties of the textual entailment relation. In particu-
lar, we see that textual entailment is context-sensitive,
intransitive, and nonmonotonic.
Inference and Belief
Here is an important clarification about the relationship
between inference and belief. Normally, when one infers
some claim B, one thereby comes to believe B. But not
always.
There are at least two sorts of cases in which one infers
one claim from another without believing it. The first sort of
case involves reasoning from a claim that one knows to be
false to another that one knows to be false. For instance:
(T18) The moon is made of green cheese
(H18) The moon is made of cheese
One can justifiably infer H18 from T18. But that doesn’t
mean that one is thereby justified in believing H18. Inferring
does not entail believing. We do this routinely in reductio
ad absurdum reasoning: we begin by assuming (for the sake
of argument) something we believe to be false and then
demonstrate its falsity by inferring other claims from it that
are indisputably false. If all goes well, one is justified in
inferring each step from the preceding step. But obviously
one does not believe the absurdity that one ultimately infers.
The second sort of case involves rejecting a claim upon
realizing what follows from it. For example:
(T19) Killing is always wrong
(H19) Killing a life-threatening tapeworm is wrong
One can imagine an overzealous pacifist initially embracing
T19. But the pacifist will see that T19 is false as soon as she
recognizes that it entails the absurd claim H19. In other
words, she infers H19 from T19 and thereby comes to see
that T19 is false. She is justified in drawing that inference,
since H19 does follow from T19. But she would not be justi-
fied in believing H19 upon reading T19. H19 is absurd, and
once she realizes that H19 can justifiably be inferred from
T19, the only rational response is to reject T19 (and perhaps
retreat to a less stringent prohibition on killing).
Thus, D11 should be sharply distinguished from a nearby
analysis D12:
(D12) T textually entails H 5df typically, a human reading T
would be justified in believing the proposition
expressed by H on the basis of the proposition
expressed by T
Typical humans know that T18 is false, and so wouldn’t be
justified in believing H18 on the basis of T18. And typical
humans would know that something has gone wrong if H19
follows from something they believe, so they wouldn’t be
justified in believing H19 on the basis of T19. D12 therefore
wrongly predicts that there is no textual entailment between
T18 and H18 or between T19 and H19. D11, by contrast,
gets the right result: one would be justified in inferring H18
and H19 from T18 and T19 (respectively), even though one
would not be justified in believing H18 or H19.
D11 should be glossed not in terms of D12 but rather in
terms of D13:
(D13) T textually entails H 5df typically, a human is justi-
fied in reasoning from the proposition expressed by T
to the proposition expressed by H
One can reason from one proposition to another without
thereby believing either proposition. And that is how infer-
ring is to be understood in D11.
Background Knowledge
As we saw in Advantages of Inferential Analyses, above,
when assessing whether one text is textually entailed by
another, we need to take into account background knowl-
edge that readers are likely to have. For instance, we want to
count the following as a case of textual entailment:
(T7) There are Algerians in Paris
(H7) There are Algerians in France
And D11, like D6, gets the right result in this case: people
reading T7 are typically justified in inferring H7, since peo-
ple typically know that Paris is in France.
But matters get complicated when we consider the extent
to which background knowledge should figure into our
assessments of textual entailment. Consider, for instance,
the following case of expert background knowledge:
(T20) Ferrous sulfate heptahydrate is green
(H20) FeSO47H2O is green
There is reason to think that this is a case of textual entail-
ment. We would certainly want information extraction appli-
cations for research databases to deliver results about ferrous
sulfate heptahydrate when queried about FeSO47H2O. And
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yet, D11 seems to give the opposite result. It is not typically
the case that humans—most of whom have no idea that
these are names for the same chemical compound—would
be justified in inferring H20 from T20.
Similar issues arise in connection with local background
knowledge.
(T21) Phil Rudd is from Tauranga
(H21) Phil Rudd is from New Zealand
New Zealanders will typically know that Tauranga is in
New Zealand; it’s one of New Zealand’s largest cities. But
most humans have never heard of Tauranga and, so, won’t
be justified in inferring H21 from T21. Yet there is reason to
treat this as a case of textual entailment. We would, for
instance, want a search application for the New Zealand
Herald’s database to deliver T21 in response to the query
“Is Phil Rudd from New Zealand?” So D11 seemingly gives
the wrong result.
But, in defense of D11, imagine somebody without any
chemistry background who needed, for one reason or
another, to know whether or not FeSO47H2O is green. The
application would not be returning useful information if it
returned a text containing “Ferrous sulfate heptahydrate is
green.” And similarly with T21/H21. If, for whatever reason,
some non-New Zealander wanted to know whether or not
Phil Rudd was from New Zealand, the information retrieval
(IR) application would not be returning the desired informa-
tion if it returned the text “Phil Rudd is from Tauranga.”
So there are good reasons to think that T20/H20 and
T21/H21 should count as textual entailments, and there are
good reasons to think they should not. The reasons for or
against seem to depend on what sort of end user we have
in mind. In the case of T20 and H20, our intuitions about
textual entailment seem to depend on whether we have
chemists in mind; in the case of T21/H21, the intuition
depends on whether or not we have New Zealanders in
mind
A way to accommodate both intuitions is to recognize
that textual entailment is relative to a variable group of end
users. More precisely,
(D11*) T textually entails H relative to group G 5df typi-
cally, a member of G reading T would be justified
in inferring the proposition expressed by H from the
proposition expressed by T
D11* correctly predicts that T20 entails H20 if we have in
mind an application for chemists, but that T20 does not
entail H20 if we have in mind end users with no training in
chemistry. (Mutatis mutandis for T21/H21.)
Relativizing the definition of textual entailment to G is a
change for the better. It provides a mechanism for capturing
pairs like T20/H20 and T21/H21 as textual entailments rela-
tive to a group GChem of trained chemists, where a group
GAnn of annotators who are not trained chemists would have
recognized no entailment. The above definition D11 can
itself be construed as an instance of D11*, defining textual
entailment for humans in general.
The sensitivity of textual entailment to a group G does
not necessarily force a deep revision to the RTE project. The
data sets against which textual entailment software is tested
are determined by annotators whose backgrounds can vary.
As we saw above, at least some background facts in these
domains need to be available for any textual entailment soft-
ware. For example, an automated theorem prover would
have background knowledge encoded as axioms for use in
deductions. In one specific example of a theorem prover
(Bos & Markert, 2005), geographic background knowledge
is taken directly from the CIA factbook. Of course, as the
examples above illustrate, there is a danger in making too
much background knowledge accessible. But accounting for
this, and accommodating the sensitivity of textual entailment
to a given group of end users more generally, simply
requires varying which background facts are accessible to
the application.
(For ease of exposition, we will ignore these complexities
for the remainder of the article, and continue to focus on the
oversimplified definition D11 rather than the more adequate
D11*.)
Inferential Distance
Recall our example from Textual Entailment as Relevant
Implication, above, of reasoning from some axioms a1. . .an
to a highly complicated and nonobvious theorem t, provable
in no less than 100 deductive steps of inference. And con-
sider the following text/hypothesis pair:
(T6) a1. . .an
(H6) t
On the face of it, this is not a case of textual entailment. Tex-
tual entailment is meant to be sensitive to practical consider-
ations. Suppose, for example, that a user of a question
answering application wants to know whether H6 is arith-
metically true, and that application returns T6. T6 is not a
useful output for the user, because it doesn’t answer her
question.
To help see this, consider the fundamental theorem of
arithmetic: that every nonprime integer greater than 1 is a
unique product of primes. The proof from the ZFC axioms
is incredibly complicated but can be laid out in such a
(tedious) way that each step of the proof textually entails the
preceding step. Now imagine a user’s disappointment if, in
response to the query “is every nonprime integer greater
than 1 a unique product of prime numbers?” an Internet
search engine led her to a Wikipedia page that simply lists
the ZFC axioms. She would be disappointed because this is
(for any normal user) an utterly useless output. The ZFC axi-
oms may logically entail an affirmative answer to the query,
but they do not textually entail one.
This is a case in which Dagan et al.’s definition D6
straightforwardly gets the right result. It is not true that,
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typically, a human reading T would infer that H is most
probably true, so D6 correctly predicts that T6 does not tex-
tually entail H6. But one might object that our preferred def-
inition D11 makes the wrong prediction. After all, there is a
justification for inferring H6 from T6, namely, the afore-
mentioned proof. So, the idea goes, D11 wrongly predicts
that T6 textually entails H6.
But this reasoning rests on a confusion between there
being a justification (or reasons) for inferring something and
one having a justification (or reasons) for inferring it. To help
see this, notice that there can be a justification for believing
something even though one does not oneself have that justifi-
cation. For instance, if the news channels have all reported
that Smith was found guilty, but one hasn’t been watching
the news, then there is a justification for believing that Smith
was found guilty but one does not have that justification. To
have a justification, it’s not enough that there simply be rea-
sons; one must also be aware of those reasons. And this is
how justified inference is to be understood in D11: one is jus-
tified in inferring H6 from T6 only if one has a justification
for inferring H6 from T6. So understood, D11 makes the
right prediction: typically a human is not justified in inferring
H6 from T6, and so T6 does not textually entail H6.
These sorts of examples also bring out an interesting and
perhaps surprising point about textual entailment, namely,
that it is not transitive (at least not in the strict mathematical
sense).17 To see this, suppose that each step in the proof fol-
lows trivially from the previous step alone. Each step
(understood as a fragment of text) will then textually entail
the subsequent step, and the penultimate step will textually
entail H6. If textual entailment were transitive, then it would
follow that T6 textually entails H6. But it doesn’t. So textual
entailment is not transitive.
Monotonicity
We just saw that textual entailment is not transitive. Now
let us turn to some examples that purport to show that tex-
tual entailment is nonmonotonic. That is, merely adding
information to a text can result in removing some of its tex-
tual entailments.
Consider T22, a passage from The Giving Tree:
(T22) And so the boy cut down her trunk. And made a boat
and sailed away. And the tree was happy.
(H22) The tree was happy.
T22 plainly does textually entail H22. And D11 bears this
out: humans would typically be justified in inferring H22
from T22. Now consider the continuation of the passage:
(T22*) And so the boy cut down her trunk. And made a boat
and sailed away. And the tree was happy. But not
really.
People reading T22* would not be justified in inferring H22.
Rather, they would know, having read the final sentence,
that the author is being facetious in the third sentence. Thus,
adding information to T22 without subtraction turns the
entailment into a nonentailment.
Another example:
(T23) Bill is so responsible.
(T23*) Bill was late to the meeting because, once again, he
forgot to set his alarm. Bill is so responsible.
(H23) Bill is responsible.
T23 plainly textually entails H23, and T23* plausibly
doesn’t. Readers will typically know that the second sen-
tence in T23* is sarcastic, and they won’t take the author to
be saying that Bill is in fact responsible.18
This reinforces a point already made in Logical
Approaches to Textual Entailment in connection with logi-
cal analysis. Algorithms for testing for textual entailment
that blindly treat any theorem as a textual entailment are
prone to false positives—in this case, because they are blind
to sarcasm and other pragmatic effects. Just as one needs to
limit what background information is available (see Back-
ground Knowledge, above), one needs to limit which logical
implications are to count as textual entailments.
We have seen that D11 predicts failures of monotonicity
in cases involving inconsistent texts. However, there are
other cases involving inconsistent texts where we intuitively
do get textual entailments. Consider, for example, a passage
from a verbatim transcript of a deposition of a witness to a
crime:
(T24) The suspect and I were at a friend’s house at 7:30 pm
on April 2, 2015 [. . .] We were at the gym at 7:30 pm
on April 2, 2015.
(H24) The suspect and I were at a friend’s house at 7:30 pm
on April 2, 2015.
Intuitively, T24 does textually entail H24; we would, for
instance, expect an information extraction application to
treat H24 as a textual entailment of T24. And, indeed, D11
correctly predicts that this is a case of textual entailment: a
human reading T24 is justified in inferring the proposition
expressed by H24 from the proposition expressed by T24.
(This is not to say that one would be justified in believing
H24 upon reading the inconsistent testimony in T24; as we
saw in Inference and Belief [above], being justified in infer-
ring something doesn’t require being justified in believing
it.) The difference between T23 and T24 that allows for this
differential treatment is that the occurrence of H23 in T23*
is naturally taken to be nonliteral speech (viz., sarcasm),
whereas the occurrence of H24 in T24 is naturally taken to
be entirely literal (though perhaps a mistake or a lie). It is a
17Pace Berant et al. (2012).
18Here we are assuming that a sarcastic utterance of “Bill is so
responsible” expresses the proposition that Bill is irresponsible, and thus
expresses a different proposition from H23.
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virtue of D11 that it is able to mark this distinction between
different kinds of inconsistent texts.
Conclusion
It is crucial that research on textual entailment be under-
written by the best possible understanding of textual entail-
ment itself. We have argued that, while the inferential
approach to defining textual has clear advantages over logi-
cal approaches, the (now) standard definition proffered by
Dagan and collaborators is in need of refinement. We have
articulated and defended a refined definition, still in the
spirit of Dagan et al.’s, according to which a text T textually
entails a hypothesis H relative to a group of end users G just
in case, typically, a member of G reading T would be justi-
fied in inferring the proposition expressed by H from the
proposition expressed by T. We have shown how our defini-
tion improves upon existing definitions, and we have
defended it against a range of objections. Finally, we argued
that textual entailment is context-sensitive, nontransitive,
and nonmonotonic. This clarification of the notion of textual
entailment may be considered, more generally, as an exer-
cise in the conceptual foundations of information science.
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